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1    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
Nos. 06-2428/ 06-2534
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
   v.
ABDUL HOWARD,
a/k/a
RODNEY BELL,
a/k/a
SALEEM RACKMAN,
a/k/a,
ADBUL TALLEY,
      Adbul Howard,
                      Appellant in 06-2428
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
   v.
JERMAINE SINGLETON,
a/k/a
BRIAN DAVID,
a/k/a
JAB
    Jermaine Singleton,
                  Appellant in 06-2534
2On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal No. 02-cr-00172)
District Judge: Honorable Stewart Dalzell
___________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
March 9, 2009
Before: FUENTES, CHAGARES and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion Filed:  April 14, 2009)
OPINION OF THE COURT
FUENTES, Circuit Judge:
Jermaine Singleton (“Singleton”) and Abdul Howard (“Howard”) were convicted
of participation in a widespread conspiracy to distribute cocaine and cocaine base in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.  Both appealed and we remanded for resentencing based on
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  See United States v. Singleton, 173 F.
App’x 141, 142 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Howard, 174 F. App’x 48, 49 (3d Cir.
2006).  Following remand, both received sentences that were substantially greater than
the defendants’ pre-Booker sentences.  Singleton and Howard appeal again, now arguing
primarily that their new sentences are unreasonable.  Howard also argues that his new
sentence was imposed to punish him for exercising his appellate rights.  For the reasons
set forth below, we affirm.
3I.
As we write solely for the parties, who are familiar with the facts, we will only
recite those facts necessary to our determination.  Howard and Singleton were among 36
co-defendants convicted of participation in a cocaine distribution conspiracy under
Courtney Carter.  Howard was a “corner boss” who managed retail distribution at a
particular location.  Singleton was a wholesale distributor who obtained cocaine from
Carter and provided it to corner bosses.
A.
Howard was originally sentenced in April 2004.  He was one of the first members
of the Carter conspiracy to be sentenced.  At both of Howard’s sentencing hearings, the
District Court found that Howard was responsible for distributing substantially more than
1.5 kilograms of cocaine base.  The District Court also found that Howard was
responsible for witness intimidation and possession of a firearm in connection with the
underlying offense.  Thus, the District Court concluded that Howard’s Guidelines range
was 360 months to life imprisonment.   
In April 2004, the District Court sentenced Howard to 360 months incarceration. 
At that time, Judge Dalzell noted his concern about Howard’s “highly unpleasant
attraction to firearms,” but acknowledged that there was no evidence that he had killed
anyone.  Judge Dalzell concluded that a 360-month sentence seemed “sufficiently long to
help assure that the banks of this defendant’s aggression will subside by the time he
4returns to civil society.”  
Howard was resentenced two years later in April 2006.  At Howard’s resentencing,
the District Court discussed the factors at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  Judge Dalzell noted “the
seriousness of [Howard’s] offense, and the powerful need to protect the public from
further crimes at his hands” and expressed concern about Howard’s “twin attraction to
drug-trafficking and firearms antedat[ing] the offense here.”  The District Court also
acknowledged that a number of Howard’s co-conspirators had been sentenced to terms of
imprisonment greater than 360 months since Howard’s original sentencing and noted the
need to “avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities.”  
The District Court also found that Howard was in the “upper-echelon of the Carter
organization,” and that his sentence should “be commensurate with those of defendants
such as Jermaine Singleton and Malik Williams.”  While Singleton was higher placed
within the conspiracy, he was not linked to firearms and made more significant efforts at
rehabilitation.  Malik Williams was another corner boss, who—like Howard—was
involved in a shooting.  As set forth below, Singleton received a sentence of 400 months. 
Williams received a 420-month pre-Booker sentence and waived re-sentencing.  The
District Court ultimately sentenced Howard to 420 months’ incarceration.
B.  
Singleton’s first sentencing hearing was held in August 2004, at a time when there
was much uncertainty about the effects of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) on
5the federal sentencing system.  Because of that uncertainty, the District Court erroneously
found that it could only sentence Singleton based on the facts found by a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt.  As a result, the District Court concluded that Singleton’s Guidelines
range was 168-210 months, and sentenced Singleton to 205 months imprisonment. 
However, the District Court noted that the quantities of drugs attributable to Singleton
probably warranted a higher sentence under a different sentencing regime.
After our remand, the District Court found that Singleton distributed over a metric
ton (1000 kilograms) of cocaine during the course of the conspiracy.  Thus, the District
Court found that the applicable Guidelines range was 360 months to life imprisonment.  
In determining an appropriate sentence for Singleton, the District Court analyzed
the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  In particular, the District Court noted that
Singleton was a “senior wholesaler” within a “violent and gigantic drug conspiracy.”  The
District Court underscored that “[t]he societal harm associated with the distribution of
such a prodigious quantity is incalculable.”  The Court noted that other members of the
conspiracy had received life sentences.  The District Court also discussed Singleton’s
lengthy criminal history, and the low probability that he would change his lifestyle, but
acknowledged that Singleton was taking steps towards rehabilitation and that he was not
personally involved in violent activity.  In the end, the District Court gave Singleton a
Guidelines range sentence of 400 months’ imprisonment.
II.
Howard argues that the District Court erred in failing to properly apply 18 U.S.C. §
 We review findings of fact that support Guidelines calculations for clear error. 1
See United States v. Kennedy, 554 F.3d 415, 418 (3d Cir. 2009).  We review the ultimate
sentence for reasonableness under an abuse of discretion standard.  Gall v. United States,
--- U.S. ----, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597-98 (2007).
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3553(a) and in giving him a vindictive sentence.   Howard maintains that the District1
Court erred in attempting to minimize disparity between his sentence and those of his co-
defendants; in determining that Howard’s sentence should be similar to those of Singleton
and Williams; and in giving sentencing disparity too much weight at Howard’s
resentencing.
“Where appropriate to the circumstances of a given case, a sentencing court may
reasonably consider sentencing disparity of co-defendants in its application of those
factors.”  United States v. Parker, 462 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2006).  We conclude that the
District Court did not abuse its discretion in considering the sentences received by
Howard’s co-defendants.  Further, despite the distinctions Howard points to, we find no
error in the District Court’s determination that Howard, Singleton, and Williams were
comparably culpable.  In addition, we find that Howard’s ultimate Guidelines range
sentence of 420 months’ incarceration was reasonable and not an abuse of discretion. 
As to Howard’s argument concerning vindictiveness, he maintains that the
increase in his sentence and in Singleton’s suggests that the District Court increased their
sentences to punish those defendants who exercised their appellate rights.  “[W]henever a
judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after [remand], the reasons for
his doing so must affirmatively appear.” Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 564-65
 Although Singleton did not brief this issue himself, he sought to adopt Howard’s2
arguments; Howard argued that Singleton’s resentencing also demonstrated
vindictiveness.
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(1984) (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 726 (1969), overruled in part by
Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989)).  
We find that the District Court’s reasons for imposing a higher sentence on both
Howard and Singleton are abundantly clear.   In Howard’s case, the District Court2
adjusted Howard’s sentence to avoid disparity with the sentences given to later-sentenced
defendants, an appropriate consideration as discussed above.  In Singleton’s case, the
District Court recalculated Singleton’s sentence based upon a fundamentally different
legal framework.  
III.
Singleton argues that the District Court erred in (1) failing to articulate the
applicable standard of proof; (2) treating the crack/powder disparity as binding; (3) failing
to give meaningful consideration to the factors at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); and (4) failing to
consider his argument about post-conviction rehabilitation.  The record belies these
arguments.  
First, Singleton failed to raise his arguments concerning the standard of proof at
his resentencing hearing.  Accordingly, this issue will be reviewed for plain error.  See
Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).  We find no indication that the District Court misapprehended the
applicable standard of proof, or that it made any errors in its factual findings.  Although
 Further, Singleton’s argument seems to be that the District Court’s error was in3
finding facts “beyond all doubt.”  (See Singleton’s Br. at 22.)  There would be no
prejudice to the defendant from applying this standard.
8
Judge Dalzell did not state the standard of proof on the record, he explained that his drug
quantity finding was based on evidence presented at the trials of Singleton and his co-
defendants, and that he and several juries found that evidence credible.  Defense counsel
admitted that the Government’s evidence was credible, and did not present any evidence
refuting it.  Accordingly, even if there was error, there would be no prejudice.3
Second, although Singleton argues that the District Court “appears to have treated
the crack/powder disparity as effectively binding,” there is no such indication in the
record.  Further, Singleton’s sentence was not driven by the fact that his offense involved
crack cocaine instead of just powder cocaine.  On its own, the quantity of powder cocaine
attributable to Singleton—more than 150 kilograms—reaches the top of the Guidelines
Drug Quantity Table.
Finally, as set forth above, the District Court discussed the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
factors at length and considered the defendant’s argument concerning post-conviction
rehabilitation.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgments of
sentence.
